Abstract:

This article focuses on problematics around men, masculinities and changing unequal gender power relations. It is based on the assumption that it is very unlikely that greater gender equality will be achieved without both greater equality and rights for women, and changing men and masculinities away from persisting patriarchal ways and means. The question then is how is changing men and masculinities towards greater gender equality to be analyzed and enacted in policy, politics and everyday practice. Specifically, the paper engages with these ongoing problematics that, over the years, the author has found to be important for theory and practice: feminism and the man/men problem; the trouble with masculinities; naming and deconstructing men; the material-discursive; the hegemony of men rather than hegemonic masculinity;
patriarchy, patriarchies, and trans(national)patriarchies; the growing politics of absence; gex; the abolition of ‘men’; and some future gender scenarios. These various problematics are both interconnected and in dialogue, even contradiction, with each other, as part of broad politico-theoretical concerns.

Keywords: men, masculinities, patriarchy, hegemony, gex, future.

Introduction

In this paper I am concerned with moving men, changing men, othering men. By this, I mean: first, seeking to open up a larger space to shift men and the category of men; second, to promote progressive change in how men behave, reducing the structural power of men, and challenging assumptions about the immutability of the category of men; and, third, decentring and deconstructing men, not (re)placing men at the centre of matters, and not colluding with attempts to do so.

For a long time I have been concerned more with critical engagement with the topic of men than with the rather elusive notion of masculinities, that is, men as subjects, as objects, and simultaneously as both. In saying this, I see men, or ‘men’, as a social category, that is, clearly and explicitly gendered, but also intersectionally gendered; it is not to be essentialised or naturalised.

The conference that led initially to this presentation, and then onto this article, or what can be understood as re-presentation, had the aims of moving away from only oppositional thinking on men and masculinities, and adding, to the critique of power, emerging models of masculinities through the interrogation of men’s practices, experiences, discourses and realities. As such, it sought to move from more reactive, negative critique to embrace positive transformation more actively.

More specifically, three themes were foregrounded in the conference: men and masculinities in relation to politics; men and masculinities in relation to care; and men and masculinities in relation to media, or as I prefer here to focus on, representation. At first
sight, this may seem, to some, a strange, even random, collection of themes. However, I see them as a fine, and positive, combination, offering many avenues for different ways of thinking and acting. So, let us consider what these three themes bring to the table. How do they connect and interrelate (Fig. 1)? How do they make for moving men, changing men, and othering men?

**Politics**

![Politics Diagram](image)

**Media/Representation**     **Care**

*Fig. 1. The conceptual relations of politics, care and media/representation*

Politics, that is, politics in its fullest sense as opposed to simply mainstream politics, concerns power and its forms, variations, distributions and recognitions. Politics can thus be everywhere: at least four theories of power … maybe five: behavioural, non-action, structural, poststructural, material-discursive (Lukes 1974, 2005; Fulop *et al.* 1999; Haraway 1992; Hearn 2014), that suggest very different understandings of both power and what politics itself is. Men and masculinities can be related to each and all of these approaches to power and politics - as action, non-action, structural relations, difference and discourse, and formed in material-discourses of worlds, bodies, economies, environments.

Care is a more specific, and indeed more positive, notion, referring to the *quality* of relations. Unlike power, care is not everywhere. Care and caring invoke some form of relationality, that is not violent, even if at times some form of violence may be done for a greater good, such as protecting people, living creatures, land or the environment more generally from threat or violence. Seen this way, care, defined thus, and violence can occur together. To say the obvious, politics link with care in many ways.
Media and the broader notion of representation are, like politics, (almost) socially ubiquitous. Most of what humans, at least, do involves some medium of communication, some representation, whether in action or speaking, in (this) writing, in the speaking that preceded it, in the use of diagrams, visuals, body language, and so on. We are always involved and implicated in re-presentation and intertextuality. However, this is certainly not to suggest that everything is socially constructed or that language is the whole world, as seems to be implied or at least prioritised by some commentators; the material world keeps on happening regardless. It is still difficult to bring the (long) dead back to life. Moreover, and very significantly, representation cannot be isolated from other socio-economic processes of, for example, production, consumption, regulation, and identity (Hall 1997).

Politics and representation, as two ubiquities, are in a complex relation. Politics necessarily involves representation; indeed all politics involves some form of representation; but, that is not to say that politics is only about representation. Care may seem less universal, but it is also implicated in politics and representation, if only negatively through absence. In the remainder of this paper, I examine the politics of men and masculinities, initially at a more general and gender-conscious level, and then the politics of men and masculinities in relation to, first, care, and, second, and briefly, representation, before some remarks on the interconnections between the politics, care and representation, as in moving men, changing men, othering men, and indeed masculinities.

The (gender-conscious) politics of men and masculinities

So, let us start with the politics of men and masculinities, in a rather broadbrush way. In mainstream politics, party politics, business politics, social movements and so on, men are often unnamed as such, even though much mainstream politics is in practice effectively "men's politics", with men seeking to interact with and influence other men. In these activities, the social category of men is still often not noticed in mainstream politics and commentaries (academic or not), often not even in critical gender commentaries (though for different reasons), or when it is usually seen as natural, non-problematic and taken-for-granted.

Gender-conscious politics that is concerned with changing men and masculinities, whether progressively or regressively, can be broadly understood in terms of personal/activist politics, policy politics, and theoretical (research, academic) politics, amongst other politics (see Hearn 2015b for a fuller exposition). Here I focus on such more
progressive politics, even if they also bring many ambiguities, challenges and tensions.² There are many overlaps and interconnections between these three realms of activist politics, policy politics, and theoretical politics, even if they are analytically distinct. In this section, I focus on, first, activist politics, then theoretical politics, before considering some aspects of policy politics, around care, in the next section. So, here I am concerned with those politics where men are the explicit focus. In this process, there is always the danger of raising up the topic of men for moving and changing, and even othering, but then this often rather swiftly becoming shifted to a recentring of men, especially are not seen in relation to and in the context of gender power relations. This is not inevitable, but Michel Foucault (1980) and many others have noted power, not Power, has an uncanny ability to reincorporate resistance and opposition into respective mainstreams, but not in an absolute and determined way.

This critical focus on men entails and operates across many dimensions. The Second Wave slogan “the personal is political” can be expanded to “the personal is political is theoretical” and “the personal is work is political is theoretical”. Each of these aspects applies especially in certain social contexts and institutions (for example, the theoretical dimension is developed particularly in academic contexts), but all are also relevant all the time. So, one aspiration here, for me, is to speak, and write, personally, politically, theoretically, without recentring men, and whilst acknowledging the dangers of a single story. Thus, the development of such politics may bring dangers, in terms of a recentring of men; instead of recentring men, men need to be decentred, or put this another way the dominant needs to be deconstructed, made Other (Hearn 1996a), not affirmed, in a process of moving men, changing men, othering men (see Fig. 2).

*Explicit critical focus on men and masculinities*

![Diagram showing the relationship between the personal, political, and theoretical dimensions.](image)

*The personal is political is theoretical*  
*Deconstruct the dominant*

Fig. 2. Key interrelations in the politics of men and masculinities
The “man question” has long been part of feminisms, as in the question: what to do with men? That story goes back many centuries. In the 1980s two inspiring responses were, from Amanda Sebestyen (1982), “I see men as my political enemies. I don't want to kill them, that's too conservative a solution. I want them to stop being men any more”, and, from Alice Jardine (1987), “we do not want you to mimic us ... What we want I would say what we need is your work”. Similarly, there has been a long debate on positive reasons for men to engage in gender change. In 1987 Raewyn Connell began the book, *Gender and Power*, with reasons to detach men, especially heterosexual men, from the defence of patriarchy: oppressiveness and injustice of gender systems, wish for better life for women, girls and other men around them. In the same year, I concluded *The Gender of Oppression* with “material reasons for men to change against patriarchy”, specifically, the increased possibilities of love, emotional support, care for and from men; privilege and emotional development from work with children; improved health; transforming work under capitalism; avoidance of men's violence; reduction of likelihood of nuclear annihilation.

There are many forms of men’s activism, in mainstream politics, business politics, social movements, and so on, that are unnamed as such and are not gender-conscious (Egeberg Holmgren and Hearn 2009). In terms of gender-conscious men’s activism, men’s movements and related activity, many different strands can be identified. They include: anti-sexist, profeminist, men for gender equality; gay; mythopoetic; queer; transgender; men’s rights; and religious perspectives. In addition, there are composite and ambiguous forms. There are also many reasons why men can be interested in gender politics, again whether progressively or not. These have been summarised by Michael Messner in terms of three distinct, if sometimes overlapping, motivations: stopping men’s privileges; highlighting men’s differences; and prioritising the costs of masculinity (Messner 1997) (see Fig. 3). Each of these can lead onto specific forms of men’s politics; in the case of the third, the costs of masculinity, taken alone out of context, can recentring men, through prioritising of men's interests within men's rights approaches. But the danger of recentring, though reduced from the other two apexes, is still present in shifting from the initial attempts to move and change men.
Stopping men’s privileges

Prioritising the costs of masculinity

Highlighting men’s differences

Fig. 3. Messner’s (1997) triangle

Having outlined some progressive tendencies, male or men feminists or profeminists are a diverse grouping. One reason is that although most would agree on the centrality of a social justice position, and the stopping of men’s privileges (at the top of the Messner’s triangle) (see Fig. 4), what actually or exactly is the positive political programme beyond that is much less agreed upon. To understand differences within that social justice position needs some further refinements, and here the work of Lorber (2005) is especially helpful, in distinguishing three broad feminist, and thus profeminist, positions: reform feminism, resistance feminism, rebellion feminism. Each of these can be characterised in terms of what it is that they direct their critique towards, as follows:

- gender reform feminism: critique/against/abolish gender imbalance;
- gender resistance feminism: critique/against/abolish patriarchy;
- gender rebellion feminism: critique/against/abolish gender categories.
This three-way analysis of men’s positionings provides a broad frame, but there are many further complications and ways of understanding such engagements, or lack of engagements, with gendered social change. One approach to what may appear relatively progressive ways of being men/masculinities concerns how difference from “other men” is constructed (cf. Hearn 1998a). This is especially important with those approaches that explicitly highlight difference, as noted, but is also relevant for the costs of masculinity position and also in relation to differences within the broader position of stopping men’s privilege. Following earlier work on “hybrid masculinities” (for example, Messner 1993; Demetriou 2001), Bridges and Pascoe (2014) have more recently clarified three mechanisms that may obscure gender power and inhibit social change. These may be summarised as: symbolically distancing from hegemonic, or dominant, masculinities; situating masculinities available to young white, heterosexual men as unmarked, less meaningful, less gendered, than those available to marginalised and subordinated men; and fortifying existing social and symbolic boundaries, thus concealing, in new ways, systems of power and inequality. Such processes can operate at both individual and collective levels, even within broadly progressive engagements with and positionings on gender change, as well as within ambiguous, ambivalent, hostile or non-gender-conscious positionings (Wetherell and Edley 1999; Matthews 2016).
These matters are relevant across different scales of activity. Whilst most activism is local and nation-based, increasingly activism on and by men, of all political kinds, progressive and regressive, is taking transnational forms, across borders and boundaries. Building on a multitude of local, regional and international interventions, a very important and broadly profeminist, transnational umbrella organisation, of men and women, that has developed since 2004 is MenEngage, with a first Global Symposium in 2009 in Rio de Janeiro, and the second in November 2014 in New Delhi over 1,200 people and 400 abstracts from 94 and 63 countries respectively. The organisation now has over 700, mainly group, members, with national networks: Africa (17), Caribbean (5), Europe (16), Latin America (10), North America (2), and South Asia (5). The New Delhi gathering also produced the ‘Delhi Declaration and Call to Action’, which sets out profeminist goals for men and boys in a global context (http://www.menengage-dilli2014.net/delhi-declaration-and-call-to-action.html). What is most interesting and important here is their global reach and their strong bases in the global South.

If we turn now to theoretical (academic, research, university) politics, some similar (if not the same) tendencies and tensions can be seen. Attempts to create a “discipline” of “Men’s Studies” tends to emphasise the costs of masculinity. Some, but by no means all, studies focused on sexuality, race, ethnicity and identity, and indeed intersectionality, have highlighted difference. And Critical Studies on Men and Masculinities have tended to favour a social justice position, with further tensions between more liberal reformist, structural resistance, and queer/deconstructive rebellious traditions, as noted, and thus different approaches to moving men, changing men, othering men. Critical Studies on Men and Masculinities (CSMM) have developed in part through critique of the (inter)personalisation of gender relations and men, and specifically sex role approaches, to the completion of multiple local ethnographies, as in the “ethnographic moment” (Connell 1998). In this, the development of masculinities theory from the late 1970s onwards, most famously through the work of Connell (1983, 1995), has been central, and particularly through the employment of hegemonic masculinity, in its various interpretations, uses and critiques, including the shift to the critique of the hegemony of men (Hearn 2014) beyond hegemonic masculinity.

The concept of masculinity, and in turn masculinities in the plural, has been at time very difficult to define, in that it can refer variously to: practices, configurations of practice, assemblages of practice, identities, types, structures, institutions, processes, psychodynamics, and so on (Hearn 1996b; Clatterbaugh 1998). Another complication is that sometimes, indeed often, masculinity as only understandable as linked to men/male bodies; sometimes there is a separation of masculinity from men/male bodies, as
in female masculinity; and a further position is that the concept masculinity, like femininity, is to be used sparingly, if at all, in the attempt to move beyond binary positions, languages and attributions. Across these various approaches, there have been many national and international research projects, many collective publications, research groups and centres, at least 16 international refereed journals, as well as encyclopaedias and many book series on men and masculinities. These are often, though not always, framed within Gender Studies, sometimes within longer established disciplines. Over recent years, there have been growing and very diverse influences on CSMM from different feminist traditions, from global studies and studies of globalisation, and from, amongst others, postcolonialism, sexuality and queer studies, body studies, and science and technology studies (STS).

Anglophone domination has been challenged to some extent, with the establishment of clear non-Anglophone research traditions, for example, in Spain and Turkey, as in the journals, Masculinities and Social Change (http://hipatiapress.com/hpjournals/index.php/mcs) and Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture (http://www.masculinitiesjournal.org/) respectively, as well as regional developments across continents, for example, in Latin America, South and East Asia, and Southern Africa. To summarise, CSMM approaches to the study of men and masculinities as historical, cultural, relational, materialist, anti-essentialist, de-reifying, naming and deconstructing, and committed to developing studies along those lines and principles. Overall, CSMM resists potential recentrings of men’s power and moves, if only implicitly, towards the decentring, the othering of men. In more everyday political language, this is neither a zero sum game nor win-win; both of those frames are limited.

Care and the policy politics of care

All of these issues and approaches introduced above, including social justice, difference and costs, have implications for policy politics. Policy politics at the national and regional levels around men and masculinities have typically focused on the more immediate aspects of life, such as family, health, interpersonal violence, emotions, sexuality, even if somewhat paradoxically bodies are sometimes not foregrounded. This policy orientation can be understood as a turn to welfarism with regard men and masculinities (Hearn 2010). Similarly, the movement away from tendencies to recentring men and towards decentring necessitates facing clear unequal gender power distributions or policy gaps, as with care, caring and the policy politics of care.
As already noted, the politics of men and masculinities, of moving men, changing men, and othering men, are very much to do with care and caring. Indeed care, and its neglect, are founding aspects of different versions of men and masculinities (Hanlon 2012). Indeed, the neglected relations of care, reproduction and politics, and domination of production in politics are intensely gendered, in content and process, in quantity and quality. This can apply in the structural, relational and agentic presence and engagement with or absence and avoidance of care within politics.

The relations of care and politics speak to the very heart of power and politics, in that care and reproduction more generally have often, perhaps typically, been subordinated to production in both mainstream and public politics, and in dominant understandings of what politics is (O’Brien 1981; Hearn 1987). In that sense, although care is not everywhere, the relations of care, including their neglect, are, and, as such, care and its neglect are fundamental foundations of what we call politics. Indeed, the question of care has been at the heart of some feminist debates for a long time: sometimes in theories of female identity and care, more often as a critique or partial critique of those positions as, for example, in Joan Tronto’s (1994) work on the ethics of care, and Diemut Bubeck’s (1995) on care and political citizenship (see also Hobson 2005). Furthermore, there are many particular arenas of care politics and politics of care, for example, the politics of welfare state, funding for informal care, as well as more intimate body politics of care.

The politics of care have been taken up in some versions of men’s activist and policy politics in different ways, with different timespans, and across countries and regions. For example, in the Swedish case, the issue was put firmly on the political agenda in the early 1960s, if not earlier. A significant intervention there was that by the journalist Eva Moberg (1961), in her critique of “women’s conditional release” as the route to women’s liberation. The idea that women should develop two roles - one as a mother and one as a worker - was seen as a “conditional release”, in which women were allowed to leave the house temporarily only if they promised to uphold their responsibility for home and children. Instead, Moberg argued for dual roles for both women and men. To change the gender order in a substantial way, women’s entry into the public realm must be met by a similar entrance by men in the private realm, the domestic, and thus greater care and caring. Ten years later the then Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, advocated a changing male role and men's active fatherhood as fundamental conditions for the national dual earner-dual carer policy (Palme 1971). Subsequent debates laid the basis for more active involvement of men in the gender politics of care, including what have been called “daddy politics”.
In contrast, in the UK, discussion of these questions was later, and in the 1970s was much more part of extra-parliamentary ([pro]feminist) politics. The case for men to be more involved in care was opened up somewhat later in the mainstream, with a more entrenched male breadwinner model, and without the benefit of Nordic universal childcare model. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the UK men’s anti-sexist and broadly profeminist “men’s movement” highlighted in their personal and public politics the importance of taking responsibility for care, especially in relation to childcare, as part of a wider gender politics. This in turn stimulated some alliances between that men’s politics and the broadly feminist childcare movement, which itself critiqued the lack of public provision in the UK, with the great majority of carework done by women.

What is interesting in both of these national contexts is how the politics of men and care have interrelated closely with the politics of fatherhood, in both personal politics and policy politics. Progressive, gender-conscious politics around men and care have been, and continue to be, accompanied by politics and policy around fathers and fatherhood (see Hearn 2002; Hobson, 2002; Collier and Sheldon 2006; Oechsle et al., 2012). Indeed, the policy debate of men and care, and on caring masculinities, has tended to be directed to such issues as paternity leave, parental leave for men as fathers, fathers defined as parents, and sometimes also to care leave, and increasingly to questions of fathers’ work-family or work-life “balance”. The politics of fatherhood, both within and outside the policy realm, have always had to deal with the influence of fathers’ rights and indeed men’s rights groups that, especially in the latter case, can take up anti-feminist positions. It often seems difficult for men to see care in its fullest sense, and not confuse and reduce that to “their” children, framed within fatherhood. This raises the questions: can there be a positive anti-patriarchal fatherhood politics? And how can that be developed? These tensions are highlighted in the MenCare: A Global Fatherhood Campaign, founded in 2011:

MenCare is a global fatherhood campaign active in more than 40 countries on five continents. Our mission is to promote men’s involvement as equitable, nonviolent fathers and caregivers in order to achieve family well-being, gender equality, and better health for mothers, fathers, and children. We aim for men to be allies in supporting women’s social and economic equality, in part by taking on more responsibility for childcare and domestic work. We believe that true equality will only be reached when men are taking on 50 percent of the world’s child care and domestic work.

Eighty percent of men will become fathers in their lifetime, but nearly all men will have the chance to be involved in the life of a child. We strive to support the diversity of fatherhood
and caregiving around the world, from fathers in nuclear families, to same-sex families, to men who take on other caregiving roles, such as coaches, brothers, or friends. (http://men-care.org/about-mencare/)

The question of how the policy politics of care can be developed to avoid the recentering of men was taken up critically in the EU ‘FOCUS - Fostering Caring Masculinities’ project (see Hrženjak et al. 2006) that ran in 2006-2007 in five countries, and then in the EU Report, The Role of Men in Gender Equality produced in 2011 and 2012 (Scambor et al. 2013). This involved engaging with the dangers of a possible return to and re-emphasis on the heteronormative “rights of fathers”, and more generally with the large variations in the extent of men’s unpaid care work across different European countries (Fig. 5). The wide-ranging EU report analysed this variation, noting how at a macro level men’s greater education tends to be associated with greater time spent on care tasks, but greater income tends to associated with less care, as does living with young children, and getting older. As a way to take a broad strategic approach to the politics of care, and not conflating that with fatherhood politics, the research consortium responsible, of which I was part, adopted the advocacy of “caring masculinities” as a policy aim. This has the advantage that it could be applied not only in families and households, but also in, for example, in terms of men’s care and caring at work and in workplaces, in politics, and so on. This broad approach has subsequently been taken up in policy work, such as the ‘Fostering Caring Masculinities’ national programme of MenCare Switzerland 2014-2027. It seems as if it is a concept whose time has come (Elliott 2016).
Importantly, the politics of (men’s) care, as examined in the EU project above, are not to be isolated from other key issues of gender power, but rather is one aspect of gender equality and gender relations more generally. This perspective is also present in the IMAGES (International Men and Gender Equality Survey) project (http://www.icrw.org/publications/international-men-and-gender-equality-survey-images), which studies individual men’s attitudes and practices towards gender (in)equality, including care. Recent IMAGES reports on low and middle-income countries have made clear the lack of transformation towards more gender equal domestic work and domestic economic justice. They point to how a significant proportion of men may report positive, if ambivalent, attitudes towards gender equality, and yet for most this is not translated into gender equal outcomes; indeed many also see gender equality as already achieved or not as a “zero-sum game”. The men who strongly support gender equality and the
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need for more progress but who believe it requires a loss for men comprised only a small proportion of men in the initial eight survey countries (Bosnia, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, India, Rwanda). Moreover, associations of anti-gender equality attitudes and racism/anti-immigration were found (Levtov et al. 2014). They have concluded that predictors of men’s GE attitudes include: men’s own education attainment; mother’s education; men’s reports of father’s domestic participation; background of mother alone or joint decision parents; not witnessing violence to mother. In turn, men’s gender equality self-reported attitudes act as predictors of men’s gender equality practices, more domestic participation and childcare, less interpersonal violence, and more likelihood of satisfaction with their primary relationship.

A more aggregated macro study, approaching similar concerns in a different way and that has analysed data at the state or nation level, is that by Øystein Gullvåg Holter (2014). This concluded that more gender equality at an aggregate level tends to be associated with better health and well-being, more happiness, less depression for both women and men, as well as less death by others’ violence, and to an extent by suicide, less divorce, more sharing of care (also see Walby 2009). Holter even argues that men may have more to gain from gender equality than women (also see Pease 2014). Greater gender equality also probably goes along with less militarism (Walby 2009).

Meanwhile, in the policy politics of men and care much less attention has been given to globalising and transnational tendencies and processes around care, compared with that focusing on a national basis and national outcomes. Yet, large-scale gendered labour migrations based on shifts in reproductive labour include global care chains, for example, beyond Eastern Europe (Lutz 2011) and global nurse care chains, for example, from Philippines (Yeates 2009), raise clear further transnational complications and implications for these policy politics of men and care.

This relative lack of a globalising or transnational perspective in the policy politics of men and care is mirrored in the neglect of many other issues in the politics of men and masculinities that transcend national boundaries. In policy politics, nation-based welfarism is dominant over transnational and global questions that even more strongly implicate men and gender power. Meanwhile, many transnational patriarchal arenas are neglected in terms of policy development in relation to men and masculinities. Such transnational arenas include: militarism and the arms trade; transnational business corporations; global finance; the global sex trade; trade in bodies and body parts, and reproductive movements; information and communication technologies (ICTs), virtualization, image transfer/circulation; environmental matters and climate change (Hearn 2015a). These transnational power arrangements are all highly relevant for the structural
distribution and constructions of men’s care, and men’s care and caring practices, and their avoidance. Indeed many of these arenas can be usefully considered within a frame of non-care, and men’s carelessness and carefree-ness (Hanlon 2012).

To take two very broad examples here that bear on the potential and possibilities for men’s engagement in care and caring masculinities: militarism, and the global economy. With regard to militarism, in 2016 over a third of the world’s military expenditure is by the USA (36%); together with China (13%), they almost half the world’s expenditure (SIPRI 2017). For the last 10 years world military expenditure has been over 1500 billion US$ (Fig. 6), while overseas development aid to developing countries has hovered around 130 billion US$ (Fig. 7). But such issues rarely figure in the politics of men and masculinities or indeed the politics of (men’s) care.

![World military expenditure, 1988–2014](http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/)

*Fig. 6 World military expenditure 1988-2014 (Source: Perlo-Freeman et al. 2015)*

Note: The totals are based on the data on 172 states in the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, [http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/](http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/). With an absence of data for the Soviet Union in 1991, no total can be calculated for that year.
Likewise, across the global economy, “(a)lmost half of the world’s wealth is owned by one percent of the population. … The bottom half of the world’s population owns same as richest 85 people in the world” (Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso 2014: 2-3, citing Credit Suisse 2013, and Forbes 2013; also see Nixon 2012; Hardoon et al. 2016). At the same time, the financial sector itself has mushroomed in recent years, so that size of sector far exceeds, perhaps 12-fold, the world’s GDP; and foreign exchange market of about $5 trillion per day, with three percent linked to international trade, and the remainder to speculation (Philpponnat 2014).

Surely, these are also matters for the politics of men and masculinities, and specifically the politics of men and care and non-care. What chance is there for moving men,
changing men, othering men in relation to care without some recognition of these enormities in militarism, global inequality and non-care?

Representing and the politics of representation

Third, what has representation to do with moving men, changing men, othering men? As noted, representing and representing is always present, in all arenas and politics of men and masculinities, in personal/activist politics, policy politics, and theoretical politics, and also in care and the politics of care. Representation may be in writing, (this) writing, as representation, in (previous) speaking as representation, in representations offline or online, in visuals as representation, in nonverbal and importantly in silent communication and silences. Representation is rarely simply about representing a given thing; there is no pure, innocent representation. Representation is always with us, like it or not, even if not all is discourse, language or text.

To take an example here, that of the representation and (men’s) violence, surely a topic that is highly relevant to men and masculinities, and impossible to ignore in moving men, changing men, othering men. It is not easy to represent violence, in text, in visuals, in sound, and so on, without reproducing some aspect of violence. Likewise, how violence is talked about, whether by perpetrators, politicians, police or professionals, is a vital part of stopping violence, and changing the gendered social relations of violence, non-violence, and indeed care and caring. To put this differently, how violence is represented is part of the practice and reproduction of violence and moves away from violence. Violence and representation of violence are very closely intertwined, and as such a key part of developing policy politics on men’s violence (Hearn 1998b; van Niekerk and Boonzaier 2015). Representation is unavoidable; it matters; sometimes, particularly when dealing with violence, to the extent of life and death. Thus, this question of representing violence is something that has concerned me intensely, for example, in finalising the covers of books I have written on violence.
In this first example (Fig. 8), an interview and policy study of men who had used violence against known women, mainly (ex-)wives, (ex-)partners and (ex-)girlfriends, I did not want to have anything on the cover that reproduced that violence, such as a picture of a cowering women or a striking man. In the end, I opted for this image by a Finnish artist friend, Hanna Varis, the “Tree of Truth Telling” (1994), from a larger series of abstract “trees” prints.
The second example is a bit more complex still. The book was for a start an edited collection, focusing on “the erotics of wounding”, except that the publisher did not want that as the main title. However, as editors who had initiated the concept of the book wanted to retain that focus on the cover, again without reproducing violence. Here, we opted for a photographic reproduction of an oil painting, “Stitch”, by the Dutch composer, and sound and visual artist, Martin Hoogeboom, with the image, simultaneously abstract and figurative, invoking something of the erotic in its vividness: maybe not perfect for the purpose, but at least evocative.

Arguably, visual representation is becoming increasingly important with the growth of ICTs, including the spread of online violence, hate speech, cyberbullying and harassment, “revenge pornography”, and so on. This diffusion may also aid slippages that can so easily occur around the relation of the practice of violence and the representation of violence; this can be one, but not the only, reason for the degree of disagreements between activists, analysts and commentators on the politics of men, masculinities and violence. Such divergences in approach also build on established and related differences
in the gender politics, for example, political positions around pornography. Displaying the suffering and violation of others is not straightforward, not least because of the existence of “already well-worn, predictable forms of representation.” (Rossi 1995, p.36, citing Minha 1991, p.191). Or to put it differently, “the assimilation of violent erotic images with violent erotic acts creates moral and methodological confusions which do not necessarily strengthen critiques of either violence or representation. On the contrary, such assimilations may indicate a collusion between viewer and viewed, to the extent that “the official version of things has become reality”.” (Heathcote 1994, p.156, citing Jolly 1992, p.172). For all these reasons, care, great care, is needed in working on violence, and in politics, policy and theorising around men and masculinities more generally.

The depiction, direct, indirect or allusive, of violence may raise particularly difficult, and sometimes dramatic, problematics, but this is just one example of a wider politics of representation. Questions of representation recur throughout the politics of moving changing men, othering men more generally, whether it is in activism, policy or theorising. They need to be handled with care to avoid doing more violence in the representation.

Politics, care and representation together

In this article, I have tried to engaged with the dynamic between an explicit critical focus on men and masculinities, the recognition that the personal is political is theoretical, and the attempt to deconstruct the dominant, through the examples of politics, care and representation. In this, Messner’s (1997) three-way framework has been a useful starting point, refined by drawing on Lorber’s (2005) different feminisms.

As may be clear by now, politics, care and representation, when viewed broadly, are relevant to a very wide range of questions, issues and debates on moving men, changing men, othering men. Politics - whether personal politics, activist politics, public politics, policy politics or theoretical politics - necessarily entails engagement with questions of care and representation, just as care and representation are matters of politics. Moving men, changing men, othering men entail bringing politics, care and representation together, whether in activist, policy or theoretical politics. Each of these forms of politics, by, on and around men, involves care (and non-care) and representation throughout, in the doing of activism, policy development, and theorising. In short, activism, policy, analysis, and politics seen broadly need to be recognised as material-discursive or “ma-
material-discursive” (Hearn 2014), that is both more material, more materialist, and more discursive, more concerned with representation.

Accordingly, and to take just one example, within the framing of CSMM, there are a number of enduring material-discursive tensions, between:

- the naming of men, and deconstructing and problematising men;
- the recognition of binaries, and the critique of binary/ies;
- structural, anti-patriarchal analyses, and deconstructive analyses;
- the power and privilege of men, and the dispensability of some men;
- sexual/gender difference, and the continuum/continua of sexual/gender differences;
- the prioritising of the focus on men, and the recognition that men and boys are formed intersectionally: that men are not only men, and similarly boys are not only boys.

These are all key questions in moving men, changing men, othering men in research and theorising, and in the academy more generally. More specifically, in analytical terms, this material-discursive approach involves going beyond the categories of gender and sex, for example, as with gender/sex and “gex” as representations of non-equivalence (Hearn 2012); and addressing the hegemony of men beyond hegemonic masculinity. And more dramatically, it may also entail working towards abolition of men or “men”, as a social category of power: This might be by way of a whole range of social processes: moving beyond two-sex model; queering “men”; recognising multiple gender ideologies (Meigs 1990); ageing beyond gender binary; long-term global, transnational, historical dialectics; and the impacts of advanced socio-technologies. In such ways, the subversion of the hegemony of men may become more possible, along with, for example, “gender pluralism” (Monro 2005) and “overlapping gender” (Jolly 2007). To sum up on this broad perspective, Sky Palace (2012, p.213) has written:

“Abolition. Our vision of liberation assumes not equality between genders, sexualities, and races, but the abolition of these identity categories as structural relations that organize human activity and social life. We believe that these identities are the names of real material processes of capitalism — not of something essential or salvageable within us”.

Such an orientation illustrated here combines naming, critique and deconstruction, rather than accepting fixed categories and the binaries of materiality and discourse.
Another more immediate, more concrete, substantive, bodily example concerns the representational politics of ageing men, which, far from incidentally, places questions of care, self-care, and care for others upfront. The politics, care and representation of men and ageing has been a relatively neglected theme in studies on men and masculinities, certainly so until recently. Sexual-medical knowledge on ageing males is vast, while both mainstream and critical debates on and representations of men and masculinities have often ignored or played down old(er) men in preference for a focus on boys, younger men and men of middle years. In developing this area of personal, policy and theoretical politics around ageing men and old(er) men, ambiguities persist around whether to focus on immediate older bodily experience, or structures and unequal resources, and the continuation of (some) men’s (polarising) power even with age - mirroring some of the tensions noted in CSMM above.

There are now a growing number of texts that seek to address these dilemmas and challenges, David Jackson has written several texts on men and ageing, combining reflections on: shifting embodied knowledge, (auto)biographical fragments, placing the biographical in historical context, bodily intimacy, self-caring, men-men friendships, self-reflexiveness, re-integrating “fragmentary body-selves”, and non-heroic representations (Jackson 1990, 2001, 2003, 2016). Paralleling this genre of writing, he, I, and another ten older men (who have been active in men’s progressive politics) have over a 13-year period been part of the Older Men’s Memory Work Group, based on the work of Frigga Haug and colleagues (1987; see Blake et al. 2016 on the method of working). In the group, we have written and analysed memories on many topics: a time when you became conscious of your age; men’s hair; intimacy between men; acting actively politically; clothes; food; sisters; peeing; disruptions of the male body; saying goodbye to mother; a time you were conscious of your power; sport; schooling; sex; violence; work; and ending the group. This has led to the collective book, Men’s Stories for a Change: Ageing Men Remember (Barber et al. 2016).

This process of memory-writing, combined with critical discussion, has given us much opportunity to re-evaluate our past and present lives, to change our masculinities, our practices and (our ways of) being men in the present, in the here and now. For example, listening to someone telling their story, not interrupting, waiting one’s turn, complementing or criticising the writer/teller in non-competitive, non-damaging ways when the time arose, “holding” and supporting them during difficult moments, and then putting oneself through the same (collective) process, are all interpersonal qualities not widely associated with men, but arguably necessary in changing men.
Struggle for change at the political, structural, economic and ideological levels continues, but more than this is needed, not least with the inseparability of the personal and the political, of personal, activist, policy and theoretical politics. If men could learn to trust each other more, less violence, abuse and conflict might follow. After all, this is not what men do. On the other hand, in the light of the systemic nature of male privilege, complacency in these kinds of contexts is inappropriate. Indeed a possible criticism of our memory work is that we may not have been as challenging as we could have been, in seeking not to damage group with its the warmth and support, a feature often relatively absent among many groups of men (Blake et al., 2017, 2018).

Being in this group has been a very exhilarating experience, one of the most interesting I have had, in combining intense reflections on ageing, gender, men and masculinities. It is also difficult to characterise memory work, in that it may combine, yet not strictly be any one of, writing, discussion, analysis, intimacy, care, friendship, therapy, politics, policy, theorising, deconstruction, representation … . Similarly, there are many alternative positionings that are possible in this kind of activity, including: positive and celebratory, restorative, reformist, psychodynamic and therapeutic, political (in many ways), profeminist (in different ways), performative of change, prefigurative, contradictory, intersectional, deconstructive of men and masculinity. For myself, collective memory work has been a means of representing different ways of being and doing older men, of writing about and representing that, and, at the same time, deconstructing all of that … this has all very much been about moving men, changing men, othering men.

Whether engaging in theorising, theory development and theoretical politics within CSMM or addressing the practical, experiential and activist politics of ageing men or developing policy politics in a more focused way, both care and representation are necessary elements for positive trans/formation of men. The personal is political is theoretical is care is representation.

Notes


2. Clearly, many men engage with regressive gender politics, whether explicitly or implicitly, and in less or more gender-conscious ways. Men may simply assert that they
are essentially men and “know best”, either not addressing gender as noteworthy or even paradoxically asserting themselves as the real experts on gender. Another positioning is for men to deny their gender and gender power more generally, positioning themselves as humans, often also seeing humans as man/men/male, and/or emphasising that other social divisions are much more important, meaning that gender is not. This can provide the ideological foundation for either supposedly knowing more than women about gender or avoiding gender issues. Similarly, other currencies of knowledge, such as legalism or religion, may be presented as more determinent within a supposed “gender-neutrality”, so denying (their) genderedness. A further non-gender-conscious positioning legitimating gender avoidance may be based in foregrounding the recognition of difference between individuals, whereby “men are simply individuals”. Individuals may thus be seen as ungendered and individual men’s knowledge - charismatic, entitled, mundane - may be asserted as surpassing that of other individuals, including women.

3. As an aside, David Gilmore (1990) suggests in Manhood in the Making that in many cultures protection of the community, even by violence and self-sacrifice, may be constructed as a form of responsible manhood, of being a “real man”. This might be seen by some as a different kind of care, though how it relates to interpersonal caring, often coded as female, is a much more complex matter.

4. I use the term “revenge pornography” here in inverted commas and conscious that while this term is in common cultural use it is often inaccurate, and that more accurate terms are “non-consensual pornography”, “non-consensual disclosure or distribution of nude and sexually explicit images”, “representational violence” or “image-based abuse” (see Franks 2016; Powell and Henry 2017; Hall and Hearn 2018 for further discussions).

References


HEARN, J. (1996a) “Deconstructing the dominant: Making the One(s) the Other(s)”, *Organization* 3 (4), pp. 611-626.


